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Abstract Every day, hundreds of people fly on airline tickets that have been obtained
fraudulently. This crime script analysis provides an overview of the trade in these
tickets, drawing on interviews with industry and law enforcement, and an analysis of an
online blackmarket. Tickets are purchased by complicit travellers or resellers from the
online blackmarket. Victim travellers obtain tickets from fake travel agencies or
malicious insiders. Compromised credit cards used to be the main method to purchase
tickets illegitimately. However, as fraud detection systems improved, offenders
displaced to other methods, including compromised loyalty point accounts, phishing,
and compromised business accounts. In addition to complicit and victim travellers,
fraudulently obtained tickets are used for transporting mules, and for trafficking and
smuggling. This research details current prevention approaches, and identifies addi-
tional interventions, aimed at the act, the actor, and the marketplace.
Travel fraud—An introduction
Travel fraud, for the purpose of this research, refers to the sale and use of airline tickets
that have been obtained illicitly. These tickets are often obtained using stolen credit cards
and online credentials. While evidence for this can be seen on online blackmarkets, the
nature of the problem, and how this relates to other crimes, has been rather unclear for
some time. Different industry segments see differing aspects of the problem, and
understanding the nature of this fraud type in its entirety can be challenging. This
research addresses this gap by examining advertisements on online blackmarkets,
including feedback from unsatisfied customers, and information from law enforcement
and industry obtained through interviews with relevant stakeholders. The relationship
between those travelling on the tickets, and those obtaining them fraudulently, if they are
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not the same people, is examined. Using crime script analysis, the research provides an
understanding of how this crime works and what countermeasures can be implemented
in order to make it far more difficult and less lucrative for the criminals.
Online blackmarkets are used to trade in goods, including drugs and drug parapher-
nalia, credit card details, electronics, weapons, and services, including those that enable
fraudulent activities [1–6]. Some blackmarkets are hosted as hidden services on
anonymous networks such as Tor.1 Visitors to these sites may find vendors operating
as travel agents, organising plane tickets, hotel accommodation, and car rentals,
advertised at around 20–75% of market price. The belief that the vendors were involved
in some level of criminal activity when it came to making these arrangements spurred
this line of enquiry. It was hypothesised the methods to obtain tickets included using
stolen payment information, or having insiders within the travel industry (e.g. travel
agents, airline staff) make the bookings.
Credit card data can be compromised in a variety of ways, including data breaches,
skimmers, malware, phishing, or through employees working in the financial, retail or
service industries [6, 9, 10]. To be of worth, stolen credit cards must be monetised by
those that hold them. Airline tickets, at first sight, appear to be an excellent way of doing
this as they are of high value, and are delivered electronically. Another possibility is the
vendors are ‘rippers’,2 with unwitting purchasers sending their money, and perhaps their
passport and other identification details, and receiving nothing in return.
Some policing currently takes place in relation to travel fraud. Most notably, Europol
runs ‘Global Airline Action Days’ on a regular basis, to identify and detain those
travelling on tickets purchased using stolen credit card details. These operations, which
are run in cooperation with the airline, travel, and payment card industries, have resulted
in 2090 suspicious transactions being identified, and 1078 people being detained since
2013 [12–19]. Europol allege those arrested have been travelling in order to commit
other offences, including ‘trafficking of human beings, illegal immigration, smuggling
of goods, drug trafficking, fraud, cybercrime and terrorism’ [15]. While it is unknown
where the tickets were traded, the increasing role of ‘fake online travel agencies’ has
been identified [16]. In 2015, Europol estimated the loss to the airline industry as a result
of fraudulent ticket purchases to be €1Bn [15], although the various methodological
issues when it comes to estimating the extent and impact of online fraud is noted [10].
Difficulties with detecting and reporting travel fraud contributes to the ‘dark figure’ of
crime, making quantification particularly difficult [20].
There is evidence of other methods being used to obtain tickets, in addition to
compromised card details. In the US in June 2017, a man was sentenced to over four
years in federal prison after pleading guilty to wire fraud. He used phishing techniques to
obtain credentials for Global Distribution System (GDS) companies, which provide
booking services to travel agents. These credentials were used to issue fraudulent airline
tickets valued at over US$2 m, which were sold or used personally by him and his
1 Anonymity networks are networks of encrypted connections, with random pathways through relays,
designed so observers cannot tell where data are coming from or where they are going. The onion router,
or Tor, is one such anonymity network [7]. Tor includes ‘hidden services’, which do not reveal the physical
location where a website is hosted. Another anonymity network is I2P, with hidden service equivalents called
‘eepsites’ [8].
2 ‘Rippers’ are dishonest traders who cheat buyers in online blackmarkets [11].
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accomplices. The tickets were mainly sold inWest Africa, and he had been extradited to
the US from France, after travelling there from Morocco using a fraudulent passport
[21]. There are other indicators of the close link between travel fraud and other types of
crime. For example, two people prosecuted in the UK for phishing were purchasing air
tickets to allow foreign national offenders to commit crime on London’s transport
network [22].
Travel fraud often crosses borders, which makes it particularly difficult to detect and
police. For international flights, this involves physically travelling from one jurisdiction
to another. However, it can also involve airlines, travel agencies, financial institutions,
and individual account holders in multiple countries [23]. This can create difficulties for
law enforcement when it comes to navigating the differing criminal justice systems in
which the offenders operate [20, 24]. These global aspects create opportunities for
offenders, who can target victims’ credit card details in one country and use them to
book flights with an airline in another country, while travelling to and from completely
different jurisdictions.
As noted by Payne [25], interdisciplinary efforts can expand and enhance crimino-
logical research, particularly relating to cybercrime. In computer science, the travel
industry has been of interest to computer security researchers for some time. For
example, over 10 years ago it was demonstrated that some frequent flyer accounts were
accessible if you knew the account number, which at the time was printed on boarding
passes [26]. As technology has advanced, so have the vulnerabilities. In 2016, a security
researcher spoke at the Defcon conference about his experiences generating fake QR
codes to gain access to airport lounges [27].
Nohl [28] found flight bookings could be accessed using brute force attacks, whereby
common surnames and potential passenger name records (PNRs) are repeatedly tried
against airline’s online systems. Furthermore, provided with access to a boarding pass,
or a photograph of one (which are readily posted on social media sites), the PNR can be
read with the use of a barcode scanner (and are printed in plain text on baggage tags).
Malicious actors who access booking systems in such a way could change flight dates or
destinations, or request refunds, allowing them to travel under the victim’s name. Some
airlines also allow name changes. Less obtrusively, they could insert or replace a
frequent flyer account number, to harvest the traveller’s points. While the new frequent
flyer account must be in the same name as the traveller, some airlines allow name
changes on these accounts. Furthermore, the PNR includes the passenger’s name and
email address, which may be used to send targeted phishing emails requesting confir-
mation of frequent flyer credentials or payment details. Nohl was also concerned that
GDS’ do not properly authenticate users accessing PNRs, do not rate limit attempts to
access the system, therefore allowing the brute force attacks to occur, and do not log
when PNRs have been accessed, making unauthorised access harder to detect. Nohl’s
work is a proof of concept, showing such attacks are possible. It is unknown if these
attacks, or variations of them, had already occurred, although some of the vulnerabilities
were reported many years earlier [29].
The aim of this research is to understand the trade in, and use of, fraudulently
obtained airline tickets, so as to identify intervention opportunities. As a truly interna-
tional crime, law enforcement agencies face considerable challenges in investigating
and prosecuting these offences, therefore early detection and intervention is particularly
important. Furthermore, very little is known about the economy surrounding this
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market, so identifying how the tickets are obtained will better inform the law enforce-
ment, banking sector, and travel industry response. There is a serious concern that if
people can evade existing controls, this crime type might become significantly more
prevalent.
Crime script analysis
Crime scripts outline the significant steps and actions that are carried out in order to
prepare for, undertake, and complete a crime. Crime scripts borrow from the concept of
‘schemata’; which are knowledge structures that allow individuals to organise their
thoughts or understanding of events or social interactions [30]. Crime script analysis is
a method of understanding crime types, and is particularly useful for identifying
intervention points where situational crime prevention may be applied.
Crime scripts outline typical behaviours that occur prior to, during, and after a crime
event and the actors involved in the process. The universal script involves standardised
script scenes or functions arranged in order, namely preparation, entry, pre-condition,
instrumental pre-condition, instrumental initiation, instrumental actualisation, doing,
post-condition and exit scenes [31]. Crime scripts are not prescriptive, with actors
improvising when necessary to ensure their perception of success [31]. These adapta-
tions lead to innovation in relation to offending [32]. Crime script analysis has been
applied to a variety of crime types, such as child sex trafficking [33], robbery, auto theft
and graffiti [31], drug manufacturing [32], credit card fraud [34], and the illicit trade in
pharmaceutical drugs [35, 36]. The method has also been used to look at specific crime
‘actors’, namely organised crime [37] and sex offenders [38, 39].
Hutchings and Holt [6] used crime script analysis to demonstrate how online stolen
data markets operate, and the actors involved. The marketplaces involved in that
analysis sell stolen data, provide drop,3 cashier and money laundering services, as well
as other products and services facilitating the stolen data trade, such as malware or
skimming devices. A number of actors were identified in this script, including sellers,
buyers, suppliers, moderators (who maintain order on the forum and apply the rules),
administrators (who organise the platforms and the hosting of the actual forums), and
teachers (who write tutorials and provide advice). These roles are not mutually
exclusive, as one individual may take on multiple roles, such as seller and buyer, or
administrator and moderator. Aspects of travel fraud link back to these blackmarkets, as
some tickets are traded here, as well as stolen credit card credentials or compromised
account details.
Crime script analysis is particularly useful for complex crimes involving the
intersection of different crime types (for example, [36]). According to Hancock
and Laycock [37], the value of crime script analysis is that it allows for a better
understanding of crime problems. This understanding extends to the types of
equipment, the crime facilitators, the locations where various events take place,
and the tools and infrastructure required. This knowledge can then be used to
inform context-specific prevention and disruption activities. For example, Morselli
and Roy [41] used crime script analysis to examine stolen-vehicle exportation
3 ‘Drop services’ receive fraudulently purchased goods, and can exchange them for cash [40].
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operations. They identified key brokers whose removal would result in a signif-
icant disruption to the underground market. Similarly, ‘structural chokepoints’
[36] are potential targets for intervention. Structural chokepoints are the compo-
nents of a criminal operation that are limited in number, yet critical for
profitability.
Crime scripts can use various levels of analysis, allowing it to be adaptive to
particular crime types. Of particular importance to this research is the ability to
focus on particular ‘crime-commission tracks’ ([30], p. 168). Tracks refer to
variations in a script based on salient characteristics. This is important because
there is more than one way in which travel fraud is carried out. Combining this
knowledge with structural chokepoints, it becomes evident that some counter-
measures may only address a limited selection of such frauds, while others may
have wider applicability. Furthermore, some countermeasures, such as identify-
ing and stopping those travelling, do not address the actors that are obtaining
and/or selling the tickets fraudulently.
Research design and methods
Scope
The scope of this project has been limited to airline tickets obtained fraudulently
from the travel industry. Therefore, relatively straightforward travel fraud occur-
ring in the open market, whereby the vendor receives payment but the buyer
receives nothing in return, is excluded. The sole exception to this exclusion is in
trying to determine whether sellers operating on online blackmarkets are ‘rippers’,
in that they offer the products for sale but do not deliver. It is believed these
attempted purchases are less likely to be reported by victims to the police given
the shady nature of the marketplace. Also excluded from the definition of travel
fraud is ‘friendly fraud’, where a customer claims a genuine transaction is fraud-
ulent. It is further acknowledged that other travel industry segments experience
similar fraudulent transactions, such as hotels and car hire. These are occasionally
referred to within the context of this research, but are not the primary focus.
Research questions
This research aims to set out the crime scripts involved in the trade of fraudulently
obtained tickets. In doing so, it seeks to address the following questions:
(1) What are the methods by which tickets are fraudulently obtained?
(2) Are those who purchase fraudulently obtained tickets travelling successfully?
(3) Are those who travel on fraudulently obtained tickets aware of the illegality
involved?
(4) Of those detected travelling on fraudulently obtained tickets, what was the
outcome? Were they arrested, charged, and prosecuted? If not, why not?
(5) Are those who travel on fraudulently obtained tickets involved in other types of
crime?
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This research also considers how travel fraud is currently detected and prevented,
and other ways this may be approached.
Methods
As the problem is being addressed from multiple angles (the aspects of the trade, as
well as those who travel on tickets obtained fraudulently), multiple data sources are
used. These include interviews with the various stakeholders that identify, respond to,
or are targets for travel fraud; and excerpts from an online blackmarket where fraud-
ulently obtained tickets are purchased. In addition to these formal methods, the
researcher met with a number of law enforcement agents in an informal basis, made
detailed notes, and consulted other research. Some information obtained during this
research could be used by offenders to improve their methods, or to help them avoid
detection. While interesting, such information has not been included in this paper as it
is considered prejudicial.
Interviews
Interviews were completed with participants who are familiar with various aspects of
travel fraud. These include law enforcement, analysts, and industry partners (banks,
airlines and industry bodies) who actively detect and investigate various parts of this
trade. Particular care was taken to include participants who were familiar with different
aspects of travel fraud, such as the booking of the tickets, the interception of travellers, and
those familiar with the online trade of fraudulently obtained tickets. In total, 13 interviews
were completed, with four participants from airlines, two participants held analyst roles,
three were law enforcement agents, two were from industry bodies, one was from a
financial institution, and a final participant provided insights from the hotel industry.Many
of the participants were recruited through one of the analysts, who is familiar with the
landscape, and has the relevant contacts. Further recruitment took place using a snowball
sample, in that participants identified additional organisations and individuals to speak to,
and through other law enforcement contacts. Interviews took place face-to-face, as well as
by telephone and VoIP. Participants were recruited from the US, Asia, and Europe.
The interviews were qualitative and semi-structured. An interview schedule was
used, which outlined the topics to be canvassed, however each interview was tailored
to the participant, depending on the aspects of the trade they were exposed to. Questions
explored the sale of, and travel on, fraudulently obtained tickets, and potential
countermeasures.
Ethical clearance was granted for this research, and participants were given an
information sheet providing an overview of the research before providing consent.
The interviews took between 24 min and 101 min, with an average time of 66 min. All
interviews were transcribed, excluding any information identifying the participant or
third parties.
Online blackmarket
A database of advertisements, buyer feedback, and commentary on a large online
blackmarket, which was identified as being the most utilised for trading in fraudulently
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obtained tickets, was searched. The search terms used are combinations from List A
and List B detailed below, as well as the standalone search terms in List C. List A
includes travel-related terms, however on their own these terms returned many listings
not relevant to this project. List B allowed the results to be more specific to the travel
fraud industry, and were designed to specifically elicit the feedback left by unsatisfied
customers, who may have been intercepted by law enforcement, or were unsuccessful
in their travel attempts. These comments are more forthright, and contain useful
information for identifying the methods used. List C includes a number of highly
specific terms unlikely to be used out of context relating to the travel industry. The first
three terms are names of specific GDS’, which are used by travel agencies for booking
tickets. The Airlines Reporting Corporation (ARC) and International Air Transport
Association (IATA) are industry bodies for the travel sector.
List A
travel
airline
boarding pass
flight
hotel
expedia
List B
police
europol
ripper
scam
law enforcement
cops
scammed
arrested
broker
List C
Amadeus
Sabre
Travelport
GDS
global distribution system
Airlines Reporting Corporation
ARC
International Air Transport Association
IATA
Not all search terms or combinations returned matches; however 47 unique threads
were identified, covering periods from December 2014 to August 2016.
Analysis
The interview transcripts, blackmarket content, and the researcher’s notes were
analysed qualitatively. Coding of the data was ‘data-driven’ [42], broadly based on
the universal script scenes, tracks, and actors as put forward by Cornish [31]. NVivo, a
qualitative data analysis program, was used to classify and sort the data. The results
section outlines actors and script actions relating to the travel fraud process, as
identified in the data. Quotations from participants and the blackmarket are provided
verbatim.
Scripting the travel fraud process
There is no single script when it comes to travel fraud, but rather different tracks that
overlap and intersect with each other. To simplify the complexity involved in this trade,
this crime scripting exercise divides the ‘universal script’ into three ‘Acts’. The first Act
relates to ‘preparing to travel’, and encompasses the preparation, entry, and pre-
condition scenes. The second Act, ‘the middle-men and their methods’, includes the
scenes relating to instrumental pre-condition, instrumental initiation, instrumental
actualisation, and doing. The final Act, ‘(attempting to) travel’, includes the post-
condition and exit scenes. Each Act consists of different tracks and actors, which
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provide options for how the script may develop (like a ‘choose your own adventure’
book).
ACT 1: Preparing to travel
The main objective in preparing to travel is to purchase a flight ticket from a travel
service provider.
Actors: Victim traveller; complicit traveller; mule handler; human smuggler/trafficker;
re-seller
There are five main actors identified as preparing for travel, two are actual travellers,
and three are preparing others’ travel. The two travellers are distinguished by either
being a victim traveller, who is unaware the ticket has been obtained fraudulently, and
a complicit traveller, who is aware. One participant estimates victim travellers account
for five to 10% of those travelling on fraudulently obtained tickets, although, as will be
discussed, this can be hard to verify:
From the perspective of people that are purchasing them, and this is our finding
based on the actions so far, between 90 and 95% of the travellers were fully
aware, or at least should be aware that it’s criminal activity. Between 10, but we
think it’s more close to 5% of the people, were really cheated, either online travel
agency or the criminal service was organised so well they were not able [...] to
recognise that it’s actually criminal activity behind (participant LE1).
The third and fourth actors are the mule handler and human smuggler/
trafficker, who are organising travel on behalf of others. The actors travelling
on these tickets, the mules, smuggled and trafficked, will enter the script in Act
3. Human smugglers facilitate the movement of people from one place to
another, however those travelling are doing so voluntarily (e.g. illegal immi-
gration or seeking asylum). On the other hand, human traffickers coerce,
threaten, force, or deceive those they are transporting (e.g. sexual or labour
exploitation). The fifth actor is the re-seller, who purchases the tickets and sells
them to others, most likely other victim travellers, mule handlers or human
smugglers/traffickers.
Track: Online blackmarkets
There was evidence that complicit travellers, mule handlers, and re-sellers use
online blackmarkets. There was no evidence that human smugglers/traffickers are
buying tickets here, although the possibility remains. These actors are, or should
be, aware the tickets available on these blackmarkets are obtained fraudulently.
Advertisements for travel services, along with feedback from others who have
done, or attempted to do, business with them are listed. Buyers liaise with the
seller, who will typically ask them to provide them with a screenshot (an image
file) of the booking they require, as well as the details of those travelling. An
example advertisement is:
Hutchings A.
Greetings to the community. We are a team of profesionals at the travel industry
who have been in business for over 2 years with resellers all over the globe. Now
we want to expand our business offering our worldwide travel services for flight
and hotel bookings to the […] community. Offering the opportunity to its
members to enjoy life to the fullest and make their dreams come true using our
services to get in a travel adventure to a exotic beach a weekend on a 5star resort a
getaway with your beloved ones. Be my guest to try our services to get the best
out of a trip in a healhty safe and affordable way […] Live the life of a Highroller
that you deserve enjoy life to the fullest and travel the world with your beloved
ones sharing memories that will last for a lifetime! Benefits of booking with us.
Great and affordable experiences with worldwide flights and hotels at 25% of
retail valie. Our customers safety and satisfaction is our #1 priority! Friendly
customer support active on ICQ/Jabber to answer any questions. No legal risks
involved OUR SERVICES ARE NOT CARDED! To arrange our bookings in a
safe and long lasting manner we exchange various gift cards and vouchers from
several companies and airlines to provide a safe and satisfactory services at a
great price! HOW TO BOOK WITH US. Booking request must be done with
72 h in advance. First capture screenshot of the trip you want from any agency
[…] Upload it on image upload site(anony.wsanonfiles.com) Request us a custom
listing so that we will create a custom listing for the specific amount for you.
Then provide passenger details as follows. First Name- Donald Last Name-
Trump Dob-1/Nov/1955 As soon as the order is done we will provide you
booking details for lfights and confirmation voucher for hotels. Thats it just
confirm it with airline website or calling hotel and you are ready to go […]
(blackmarket post).
Payment is made directly to the seller, or through the escrow service offered by the
blackmarket. The escrow service receives the payment from the buyer, and transfers it
to the seller once they receive notification they are happy with the transaction. Payment
is usually made using alternative currencies such as Bitcoin.
Track: Fake travel agency
Fake travel agencies trick unsuspecting ticket buyers into becoming victim travellers.
Fake travel agencies have advertised online through paid advertisements on social
network sites and search engines; websites returned through searches; through news-
papers and classified advertisements; on the radio; and through posters displayed at
airports. One participant explained how some of the fake travel agencies operate:
Many of the airlines, including ourselves, have experiences where these compa-
nies are paying for ad space on Google so that when you do a search for [Airline],
their paid ad comes up before our website comes up. And so, their phone
numbers are the first thing that people see, so the customer calls those phone
numbers, but they are not us. They are not booking with us (participant AIR1).
In this example, the agency pays for Google AdWords, so their advertisement
appears above that of the legitimate airline in search queries. The victim traveller is
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told they are dealing with the actual airline, and books the ticket as they would
normally expect to, providing their personal information, flight information, and
payment details.
Track: Insider
Insiders work in legitimate travel agencies and airlines. Insiders can take on a variety of
roles, including employees, contractors, or third party suppliers, who misuse their
privileges. While this track seems similar to the fake travel agency track, it differs in
that an employee of a legitimate provider carries out the fraud, for example:
We do get rogue employees, where they’re, on the side, taking in cash from
customers and then inserting compromised cards to pay for the ticket. That is
definitely always a concern (participant IN1).
Track: Word-of-mouth
All five actors, victim travellers, complicit travellers, mule handlers, human smugglers/
traffickers and re-sellers may also obtain their tickets through word-of-mouth. Intro-
ductions are through close-knit communities, informal networks, and even through
church groups:
But there are also tickets sold in communities, for example, some passengers who
have been interviewed say that they get the tickets through their church (partic-
ipant AIR4).
Often there is an element of trust, in that the seller has been recommended through
others. In some instances, they are friends and family members. On the other hand,
some travellers purchase tickets from people they have only just met. In relation to re-
sellers and mule handlers, there was evidence in the blackmarket that trades were also
taking place off-forum, with those who had developed business relationships with the
sellers.
ACT 2: The middle-men and their methods
The first Act explores the different options by which tickets are purchased. In Act 2, the
methods by which these tickets are obtained are outlined.
Actors: Blackmarket seller; fake travel agent; rogue employee
In many cases, the person travelling on the ticket is not the person who actually
obtained it from the affected airline or travel agent. In Act 2, a number of new actors
are encountered: the ‘middle-men’. These include the blackmarket seller, the fake
travel agent, and the rogue employee. The reader may recognise that some of these
actors correspond to the tracks outlined in Act 1. For instance, the blackmarket seller
operates within the online blackmarket track, the fake travel agent within the fake travel
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agency track, and the rogue employee is the actor the insider track. This Act will
demonstrate the methods used by these actors, which again may overlap and intersect
across the different tracks.
Track: Compromised credit cards
Compromised credit cards are used by a number of actors, including blackmarket
sellers, fake travel agents, and rogue employees. Compromised credit cards can be
used to book tickets directly with the airline, however chatter on the blackmarket
indicated that airlines are more likely to detect this type of fraud. Therefore, many
blackmarket sellers will instead book with smaller travel agencies without sophisticated
fraud detection systems. There are also different places compromised credit cards are
used, such as through a booking website, a call centre, in-person at a travel agency, or at
the airline’s desk in an airport.
The compromised card data can be purchased from the same, or similar,
blackmarkets where the travel services are offered for sale. It is believed many of the
middle-men are specialists, and are purchasing the data, rather than obtaining them
themselves. This is not always the case, with a police investigation revealing one group
obtaining tickets using credentials they had phished themselves.
The compromised credit card track is one of the most versatile. It is also one of the
more obvious means by which tickets are fraudulently obtained, and therefore the most
likely to be detected and cancelled. However, there was evidence of diversification. A
number of methods were identified that enabled compromised cards to be used in a way
to slow detection and circumvent fraud detection systems. Middle-men have also
displaced to new methods, such as those explored in the following tracks.
Track: Loyalty point fraud
Loyalty points, also referred to as reward points, frequent flyer points, or miles, are
offered by airlines and banks to reward their clients for repeat custom. The loyalty
programs have differing rules limiting the movement of points from one account to
another, however many can be used to book a ticket in a name other than the account
holder, and if the loyalty program is part of an alliance, can be used to obtain tickets
with a number of airlines, therefore making detection more difficult.
Participants explained when a loyalty point account was compromised the first thing
they see is a change to the email address associated with the account. The credentials to
access the account may also be changed, and sometimes the address and phone number
stored on the account. After this, the points accumulated in the account are used. It is
believed the majority of accounts are compromised because the account holder has
used an email and password combination shared with a breached account. Airlines and
financial institutions can see the automated testing of multiple username and password
combinations attempting to access their systems. It appears these login attempts come
from account checkers, which test compromised data against a variety of different
online accounts in order to gain access. Social engineering attempts, through social
network sites, have also been seen, although it is not believed this works at scale. Some
accounts are also compromised by telephone, by calling the bank or airline and
impersonating the account holder.
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Track: Unauthorised access to global distribution systems
Travel agencies book tickets using a GDS to link with the airlines’ computer reservation
systems. A number of different companies provide GDS’, including Amadeus, Sabre
and Travelport. For a six-year period, a group in the Ivory Coast was compromising
these systems, and issuing tickets fraudulently. Phishing emails were sent to travel
agencies to obtain their login credentials to the system. As it appeared the affected travel
agency had issued the tickets, they would be invoiced for the travel. The travellers were
also mainly from the Ivory Coast, and in some cases waited at the airport for the ticket to
be set up. While this group apparently stopped in 2014, the use of this method may be
ongoing. The method is consistent with other instances of detected fraud, and terms
related to GDS’ turned up occasionally on the blackmarket, for example:
User 1: Soon we will have hacked amadeus logins but we will list this when ready
[...]
User 2: Care you elaborate how are you going to use them? Thank you [...]
User 1: Book tickets (blackmarket post).
Track: Compromised business accounts
Much legitimate travel is for business purposes, and many businesses have corporate
accounts with travel agencies for their bookings. Furthermore, some travel agencies only
deal with business clients, and some large organisations will have their own internal
travel agency. Business accounts can be compromised through a variety of ways, either
aimed towards the corporation, or the travel agent. One scheme involves what is known
as business email compromise. This either involves the compromise of a legitimate email
account, or the creation of an email account that appears to belong to target, such as
registering a similar domain name. This email account can then be used to converse with
the travel agency, and trick them into issuing a ticket that is then invoiced to the corporate
account. Depending on how long it takes to identify, this type of fraud can perpetuate for
some time. Corporate booking tools, which allow businesses to make bookings directly
through their travel agency’s system, are also vulnerable to attack. Once compromised,
they are used to purchase as many tickets as possible before being detected.
Track: Identity fraud
There was some speculation on the blackmarket that one method sellers can use is
identity fraud. This involves opening a credit account in a fake or victim’s name,
and using this to purchase tickets. The advantage of such an approach over the
compromised credit card track is there is no chargeback when the victim finds
unauthorised transactions on their account. However, the downside is this method
requires a level of information that is hard to obtain and use in such a way to
obtain a high credit limit, and newly created cards used for suspicious transactions
such as flights are usually blocked quickly. Therefore, participants confirmed this
method is identified occasionally, but not as frequently as compromised credit
cards and loyalty point fraud.
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Track: Voucher fraud
Vouchers include gift vouchers for travel services, as well as vouchers issued by airlines to
compensate travellers following a disruption to their journey, such as a delayed or
oversold flight. Like loyalty points, vouchers are an internal currency, and are therefore
vulnerable to fraud. Rogue airline employees have been found issuing vouchers when no
negative experience has been incurred, and not providing the voucher to the intended
recipient.
A blackmarket seller was also offering the sale of travel gift vouchers. They claimed
to have gift card numbers that had been issued years ago but not used. This vendor
attracted a lot of attention, with one of the selling points being the buyer could make the
booking themselves, without providing their personal information. However, this seller
was only operational for six days before buyers started reporting bookings being
cancelled. There are a number of ways disused gift cards might be obtained, including
having a rogue employee in the company, or accessing their computer systems remote-
ly. Alternatively, the seller may have lied about their method, and purchased gift cards
using compromised credit cards.
ACT 3: (attempting to) travel
Actors: Victim traveller; complicit traveller; mule; the trafficked/ smuggled
The victim traveller and complicit traveller reappear in Act 3, along with new actors, the
mule and the trafficked/smuggled. The victim traveller may be journeying for a variety
of reasons, just like any other traveller. Similarly, the complicit traveller may be travelling
for personal reasons, such as taking a holiday or attending a family emergency. One
potential complicit traveller identified in a blackmarket post they were planning their
honeymoon. However, some complicit travellers carry out other criminal activities. Mules
may be aware they are facilitating crime, or theymay be victims, such as ‘romanticmules’,
who believe they are in a relationship with their handler. Unlike complicit travellers, it
appears mules and the trafficked/smuggled are providedwith the tickets, rather than obtain
them themselves, and may not be aware of their fraudulent origin. It was believed the
majority of the smuggled are trying to escape hardship, sometimes trying to reunite with
their families, whereas many of the trafficked are facing sexual exploitation.
The tracks present in Act 3 provide potential experiences the traveller may encoun-
ter, including cancelled bookings, being detained by law enforcement, providing
identification, and travelling successfully. Act 3 also contains a track for involvement
in other crime.
Track: Cancelled booking
The most common way a journey goes awry is if fraud is detected and the ticket is
cancelled. This can happen shortly after booking, or shortly before the flight (although
sometimes these may be the same time). The latter appears to have the most impact, as it
does not allow time to seek alternative arrangements. Another outcome of cancellations is
that complicit travellers and mule handlers complain using the feedback mechanism on
the blackmarket. If a blackmarket seller is experiencing many unsuccessful bookings,
Leaving on a jet plane: the trade in fraudulently obtained airline...
they will be labelled a ‘ripper’ or ‘scammer’, and in some cases will be banned from the
marketplace.
Airlines are juggling two sometimes competing imperatives, one being fraud detec-
tion and prevention, while the other is the customer experience. One concern airlines
have when it comes to cancelling flights is the possibility of false positives, whereby a
ticket that appears to be fraudulent is in fact legitimate. An alternative to cancelling a
ticket, particularly if the airline has not been able to formally confirm a transaction is
indeed unauthorised, is to put the transaction on hold, and request an alternative form of
payment at the airport prior to boarding. This method also allows the airline to gain
some intelligence about how the ticket was obtained. As the original payment is then
reversed or not processed, legitimate travellers are only paying once, and victimised
card or account holders do not suffer any loss. However, those who have purchased
fraudulently obtained tickets will essentially pay twice for their journey, if they wish to
board the flight. Airlines try to minimise the impact on victim travellers, but they can be
hard to differentiate from complicit travellers. Advice on the blackmarket for travellers
who face this scenario is ‘you pay no argument/questions asked’.
Track: Detained by law enforcement
In some cases, law enforcement become involved, detaining and questioning those travelling
on fraudulently obtained tickets. This may be part of the Global Airline Action days, run
with Europol and other industry and law enforcement partners, part of a focused investiga-
tion, or done on an ad hoc basis. As identifying who is truly a victim traveller is problematic,
when a traveller is detained, they are rarely charged with any crime. These difficulties have
not gone unnoticed on the blackmarket. While they have shared media releases relating to
the global action days, they also note law enforcement are rarely involved, and when they
are, the traveller, not the person who obtained the ticket, is targeted:
Although it looks like theyve arrested purchasers of said service but not the guys
running the business in the first place... (blackmarket post).
However, participants indicated that law enforcement are starting to take more notice of
travel fraud, and even when a passenger was detained with no charge, this ultimately
causes some disruption to the person who had organised the ticket.
Differentiating complicit travellers and victim travellers is complicated as the former
can easily claim to be the latter. The blackmarket contain advice about how to do this if
detained, including preparing fake correspondence before travelling. The provision of fake
correspondence and receipts has even been advertised as a service on the blackmarket.
Track: Providing identification
The use of fake or stolen identification was discussed on the blackmarket, and the
consensus was, for flights at least, the traveller’s genuine passport should be used. This
may seem counterintuitive at first, particularly as fake identification can be obtained in
these blackmarkets, and their use hides the traveller’s real identity if the fraudulent
ticket is discovered. The reason fraudulent or stolen identification is not recommended
is, as identified in the detained by law enforcement track, travellers can easily claim
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they are victim travellers, and travelling with fake identification would not lend any
credence to this assertion. Indeed, travelling on false identification would increase the
risk of detection.
Most participants agreed travellers used their own identification, however this is not
always the case. It is likely that where a false identification document is used, it would
have been used anyway, regardless of how the ticket was obtained, such as to avoid
travel watch lists. Some participants hypothesised travellers would be more likely to
use a fake name for bookings when travelling domestically or within the European
Schengen Area, where identification is not necessarily checked for border control
purposes.
However, just because genuine documents are provided, it does not mean all the
information provided to the airlines when the tickets are purchased is correct. Advice
given on the blackmarket is to change the details slightly, and airlines also advised this
happens. It seems that when a passport is swiped at check-in, at least for some airlines,
any incorrect information, such as a wrong date of birth, is automatically updated.
Track: Travelling successfully
If the ticket is not cancelled, the passenger is not detained by law enforcement, and
there are no other reasons the travel did not occur (such as missing the flight) then it
is likely the traveller reaches their destination successfully. Complicit travellers who
purchased their ticket through a blackmarket will sometimes provide feedback,
advising if they travelled successfully or not. Some blackmarket sellers provide a
free or heavily discounted ticket when they are just starting out, in exchange for
‘vouches’, whereby the buyers will write a review of the service provided. In other
cases, feedback is left for other potential customers, particularly where travel has not
been successful.
Another step in travelling successfully is releasing payments through the escrow
system, if this was used. However, it is apparent many blackmarket sellers are asking
for release of escrow after the flight booking has been confirmed, rather than after the
journey. This can lead to problems when the ticket is later cancelled. As mentioned,
complaints about unsuccessful journeys can lead to allegations the blackmarket seller is
a ripper when payment is not refunded.
Track: Involvement in other crime
As has been alluded to throughout this script, some of those travelling on fraudulently
obtained tickets are known or suspected to be involved in other offences. In addition to
human smuggling and trafficking, other crimes travellers are known to be involved in
include: theft, including pickpocketing and shoplifting from airport stores; smuggling
cash and contraband, such as drugs, cigarettes and tobacco; facilitating money laun-
dering, such as opening bank accounts in other countries; and credit card fraud,
including making transactions with compromised cards, and operating skimmers. With
some of these additional offences, there are elements of organised crime and co-
offending present.
There were suspected links to terrorism financing, however there was little evidence
to support this concern. There were also claims the movement of people and proceeds
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from the sale of some fraudulently obtained tickets were linked to an alleged terrorist
group. Some of the offences listed above are more readily ascertained than others,
particularly when contraband is involved. On the other hand, mules opening bank
accounts, and human smuggling/trafficking may be less likely to be detected. Further-
more, some contraband, such as credit card skimmers, may be difficult to recognise by
those who are untrained.
Current and emerging approaches to detection and investigation
There are a number of approaches currently used to detect, prevent, and investigate
travel fraud. The first approach is detecting tickets from being fraudulently booked to
begin with, and cancelling those tickets that have been booked to prevent the travel
from taking place. This section also explores law enforcement action against travel
fraud, particularly outside the Global Airline Action Days, and ways information is
being shared within the industry.
Detecting and cancelling fraudulent bookings
Fraud detection systems are used to detect fraud at the time of booking. These systems
use algorithms to score the potential risk of a booking. Risk factors can include details
about the person travelling, the way the booking was made, the route being flown, and
associated variables, such as time before travelling. A risky booking can then be
reviewed, and attempts can be made to confirm its legitimacy, by making enquiries
with the card issuer. If there is confirmed fraud, or significant doubt, the booking is
cancelled, or another payment method is requested.
Airlines and travel agencies may run fraud detection systems against their bookings.
Furthermore, financial institutions attempt to detect fraudulent transactions on their
cards. Banks and airlines sometimes use a third party vendor for their loyalty programs,
which may also use their own fraud detection systems. Multiple parties operating their
own fraud detection systems is beneficial, as while one party, such as an airline, may
see deeply into fraud on their own systems, another party, such as a bank or third party
vendor, may see more breadth, with attempted fraud across multiple targets.
Another organisation that has the ability to see fraud across a wide number of targets
is the Airlines Reporting Corporation (ARC), which plays an active role in detecting
fraudulent travel booked with travel agencies. ARC facilitates the payment for tickets
between US travel agencies and US and international airlines. As a result, they can see
who is booking tickets, with which agency and airline, and what route is being
travelled. Due to the volume of data, ARC mainly reviews transactions relating to
high-risk locations associated with large amounts of fraud. Outside of the US, IATA has
a similar financial collection function to ARC.
Blacklists, or name traps, make up a part of fraud detection systems, to identify
names or other identification information associated with fraudulent transactions in the
past. The topic of blacklisting generated many comments on the blackmarket, partic-
ularly what the outcome was if a name was blacklisted. One person posed a question
enquiring if blacklists target the vendor or the passenger. The response indicated that
even if a traveller is blacklisted, they are still able to travel if they use legitimate
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payment methods. Another commentator compared a number of blacklisting practices,
claiming they were often easily circumvented or non-existent. One concern with
permanently blacklisting travellers is that victim travellers are not aware of the illegit-
imacy of their tickets. Furthermore, if limited or incorrect information is provided,
making an accurate match can be difficult.
Fraud detection systems are not foolproof. In particular, they have mainly been
developed to detect fraudulent credit card transactions, so few will detect more
elaborate frauds. Furthermore, they are not always run against telephone or in-
person bookings, or against changes to bookings. Detecting, and confirming, fraud
can take some time, and the criminals have found booking close to departure can be
successful. ARC only sees transactions after the end of each day, due to the way they
are batched and sent for settlement of payments between the travel agencies and
airlines.
One of the main difficulties with identifying fraudulent transactions relates to
receiving confirmation from a bank a credit card transaction was not authorised. This
can take time, particularly if multiple time zones and languages are involved. This
issue is compounded when there is no incentive for the bank to detect fraud
themselves, or respond in a timely fashion. If the transaction is fraudulent they
suffer no financial loss, with the airline or travel agency generally liable for the
chargeback.
Further ways service providers try to prevent tickets from being booked fraudulently
include identifying and resetting passwords for compromised loyalty point accounts.
One participant advised they see attempts to validate large numbers of credentials over
short periods. The level of security for access to loyalty point accounts varies, with
some just requiring a short PIN, and others a password. However, at least one airline
advised they were moving to two-factor authentication.
Some airlines and travel agencies are now accepting Bitcoin as a payment method.
This poses potential new avenues for fraud detection – not only detecting compromised
Bitcoin, but potentially the use of block chain analysis to identify Bitcoins associated
with known bad transactions such as money laundering.
Law enforcement involvement
Getting law enforcement involved in combating travel fraud has been an ongoing
process. Europol has taken the lead, coordinating the Global Airline Action Days since
2013. These have gradually expanded, to increase the number of jurisdictions involved.
The action days are run in conjunction with local law enforcement, airlines and
financial institutions, to detect fraudulently obtained tickets, and those travelling on
them. Outside the global action days, it can be challenging to get law enforcement
involved. Some of the issues include:
& The low dollar amount for one-off purchases. This has been noted in the
blackmarket, where actors reassure each other the risk is low for this reason. Some
participants said they could only get law enforcement involved when losses started
to reach multiple hundreds of thousands of dollars.
& Fraud is not seen as a priority for law enforcement. Furthermore, adding complex
international aspects can make investigations unattractive to pursue.
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& A lack of international contacts. Like many interactions in life, having trusted
relationships can make communications easier. However, due to the global nature
of travel fraud, making connections with law enforcement all around the globe,
with different time zones and languages, can prove difficult. While airlines advised
they often have good relationships with their local law enforcement agencies, this is
more difficult in non-local jurisdictions.
& Some policing agencies do not want to, or cannot, get involved in cases not directly
relating to their own country, such as when an international traveller is arriving on an
airline from another country, and the affected financial institution is also overseas.
& There can be local jurisdictional issues. For example, in some countries the police
officers working in airports have no jurisdiction over fraud matters.
& A lack of awareness about travel fraud. Many law enforcement officers are not
versed in complex frauds, and there is little institutional knowledge. Even when law
enforcement detains a traveller, they may not know what questions to ask.
& Problems with being able to charge those travelling. This issue is compounded
when travellers are, or claim to be, victims who do not know the ticket they are
travelling on has been obtained illegally. Furthermore, some law enforcement are
unlikely to charge someone with credit card fraud if they are not in physical
possession of the card, even for card-not-present transactions.
There is also seldom any action taken after a flight has already occurred. Of course,
this can be challenging for law enforcement, because in addition to the points covered
above, the location and residence of the traveller can be difficult to identify. Detaining a
traveller during their journey is comparatively much simpler, due to their physical
presence at the time. Furthermore, for airlines, valuable time and effort would be
required, which can be better spent trying to detect and stop travel that has not yet
flown. However, work is progressing to identify prolific travellers, who travel many
hundreds of times on illegitimate tickets, by both law enforcement, and the travel
industry. One of the biggest issues with policing travel fraud may be taking action
against those responsible for making the fraudulent bookings, rather than the travellers.
There were indications that efforts to involve law enforcement were improving.
Participants credited Europol and the National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance
for helping to address this issue. Some law enforcement agencies had also started to
recognise the problem, with the one cybercrime unit opening a reporting platform to
receive incidents from the travel industry.
Of course, the problem is not solely about getting law enforcement involved. A
related concern is the travel industry not reporting this type of fraud to the police. Due
to the volume of fraud identified, and many bookings being made at the last minute, the
most common response is to cancel the ticket, without any reporting. It was also
believed the time and resources required to cooperate with a police investigation would
be too extensive and expensive to be of value. In some countries, trust in law
enforcement may be lacking, hindering cooperation with the travel industry.
Sharing information
Due to the number of different airlines, travel agencies and financial institutions
involved, everyone holds a different piece of the puzzle and it is difficult to see the
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whole picture. One way the response can become better coordinated, for both fraud
detection and enforcement, is to share information, within the bounds of the law
relating to personal data. There are concerns about the sharing of personal data,
particularly when the jurisdictions and legal frameworks differ. However, there are
often exemptions for the prevention of fraud, and passing information to law enforce-
ment. Therefore, it may be possible to share data under cover of a formal contract. In all
cases, local legal advice would need to be taken. The benefit of data sharing, and
combatting travel fraud as a collective, is becoming recognised. While these organisa-
tions may be competitors, the value of the collective information is greater than its
individual parts. As offenders may displace from one travel provider to another,
learning from others’ experience can mean that fraudulent bookings can be detected
straightaway, before chargebacks start being incurred. In recognition of this, sharing
networks have started to spring up globally. These include:
& Listservs (email distribution lists) used to share data associated with fraudulent
bookings. As they also share information relating to loyalty point compromise, data
sharing partners include financial institutions, as well as airlines, law enforcement,
and industry bodies.
& The European Airlines Fraud Prevention Group. The group communicates and
meets regularly, sharing data to assist in fraud detection. This group was the original
group working with Europol with the global action days. As the name implies, the
group is made up of European airlines.
& Similar fraud prevention groups based in Asia and Latin America, based on the
European group. These fraud prevention groups are organised under IATA.
One of the potential barriers to data sharing is trust. Organisations need to trust the
data is only being used for the purposes for which it is being shared. They also need to
trust whoever is centrally organising the data sharing platform. Participants advised
they had started to develop better trusting working relationships with others as a result
of information sharing. Some organisations seemed more comfortable with accessing
information, but not sharing it themselves, but developing that trust was seen as a step
towards breaking down that barrier. There were hopes for more fraud prevention groups
to be set up, and that data would start to be shared across travel providers globally.
As well as sharing information between travel providers, the benefits of sharing
information with financial institutions was acknowledged. This was particularly the
case when attempted bookings are not processed due to fraud, but the bank is not
informed of the attempted transaction. The card may be compromised, but if the issuing
bank is not aware, they will not cancel the card or monitor it for other suspicious
transactions.
Increasing data sharing with police may also be of value when it comes to triaging
reported fraud. Europol has a database of suspects linked to other crimes, such as
trafficking, illegal immigration, and financial crime. This database has been of use to
link instances of travel fraud to other forms of criminality. Furthermore, the jurisdictional
boundaries surrounding policing agencies means each may hold different pieces of
information. Local police may hold some data, some may make it into national police
databases, and, as identified, some may be shared internationally. Of course, the right
questions need to be asked in the first place, and a standard questionnaire for use by law
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enforcement may be a good place to start. Only data properly recorded, shared, and
searched will be of later use.
Because of the way participants were identified to be interviewed for this research,
everyone was highly connected and involved in data sharing. However, it was ac-
knowledged there are many involved in the industry that do not yet benefit directly
from such an approach.
Potential alternative intervention and disruption opportunities
Crime script analysis is used to identify the intervention points where crime disruption
initiatives may have the best effect. One way to focus on structural chokepoints relating
to the online trade of illicit goods is to identify those aimed at disrupting the act, the
actor, and the marketplace [43, 44]. In relation to travel fraud, the act is obtaining
tickets fraudulently, the actors are those buying, selling and travelling on tickets, and
the marketplace is where the fraudulently obtained tickets are sold. There is not scope
to identify all the different ways these methods may be detected and prevented within
this section, particularly as some are likely to have already been implemented. How-
ever, during the interviews it became evident there were some initiatives that may be of
use to address particular chokepoints, which were either not used, or were
underutilised.
Interventions aimed at the act
Known methods for obtaining tickets fraudulently include the use of compromised
credit cards, loyalty point fraud, unauthorised access to the global distribution systems,
compromised business accounts, and to a lesser extent, identity fraud and voucher
fraud. In relation to compromised credit cards, one participant advised 20% of airlines
did not verify credit cards through the CVV, the three digits located on the back of the
card. Requesting the CVVat the time of transaction may be one step that can be taken
to improve security. While this is useful, it is not foolproof, as the CVV may also be
compromised. In addition, recent research has found bots may be utilised to guess the
CVV and expiration date of Visa cards in as little as six seconds [45].
A number of disruption mechanisms may be useful for preventing loyalty point
fraud. Some participants noted the first thing they saw occur on accounts once they had
been compromised was a change of email address, and sometimes other contact details
such as phone number. Therefore, making it more difficult to change the details on the
account for someone who is not the account holder could provide better security. Some
form of multifactor authentication may be applicable to address this problem. For
example, changing the telephone number may require the account holder to confirm
the change via an email sent to the address on the account. Conversely, changing the
email address may require an authentication code sent to the account holder’s phone to
be entered. Changes to the contact details made over the phone, as well as using the
online system, would also need to be verified, to minimise displacement. Implementing
some kind of multi-factor authentication for access to accounts could also be a future
consideration, although the specific needs of travellers do need to be taken into account.
For mobile authentication, this includes access to mobile phone networks and the high
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cost of roaming charges, while for physical tokens there may be limitations on what
account holders will want to carry with them.
Some participants also advised they could see credentials, apparently breached
elsewhere, being checked against their loyalty account login systems for a match.
Automated checkers are also used for compromised credit cards, to determine if a card
is still active. Potential countermeasures against credit card checkers may also be of
value to prevent the automated checking of credentials. Anti-automation methods
suggested by Peacock and Friedman [46] include the use of CAPTCHAs, reputation
methods, proof-of-work problems and real-time polymorphic web content. This would
require offenders to test credentials manually, thereby increasing the effort, cost and
time involved.
There could also be changes to how cancellations are handled to have a greater
impact on travellers using fraudulently obtained tickets. It seems the most disruption is
caused when flights are cancelled immediately before boarding, as cancelling them
beforehand provides time to make alternative travel arrangements. Furthermore, this is
likely to have a negative effect on the reputation of blackmarket sellers, who in some
cases are requesting escrow funds to be released prior to the flight. One way airlines
could change their practice is to only notify cancellations due to fraudulently obtained
tickets at the time of check-in. The argument against this is victim travellers would be
left stranded. While they may have to pay twice in order to travel, this is likely to be the
same outcome if the ticket is cancelled earlier.
It is noted some of these methods, and others, that may disrupt fraudulent bookings
require an investment on behalf of the travel provider. For airlines to invest in better
security, there is a recognised need for a change in the perception at the corporate board
level that fraud detection is not an expense, but a saving.
Interventions aimed at the actor
Interventions aimed at particular key actors may have a disproportionately large effect.
Some participants believed a small number of actors are associated with the majority of
fraudulent sales and re-sales. These actors are perhaps the targets law enforcement
should be focussing on, rather than only those who are travelling on the tickets they
obtain.
For key actors operating on online blackmarkets, where attribution may be difficult,
there are other ways their businesses may be disrupted. These methods are aimed at
creating the appearance of mistrust between buyers and sellers, referred to as
‘lemonising the market’. A lemon market is one in which there is quality uncertainty;
therefore, those selling quality products are unable to differentiate from sellers with
poor-quality products and cannot compete with their low prices [47]. As a result,
engaging in the market would increase the effort and cost of crime for buyers and
reduce their expected benefits. Markets may be lemonised using Sybil and slander
attacks, leaving comments highlighting the dangers of travelling on fraudulently
obtained tickets, and providing false information. In relation to travel fraud, sellers
are usually provided with information about who is travelling. Sowing mistrust within
the blackmarket may have people thinking twice before providing personal informa-
tion. However, it is important to consider legitimacy and due process when undertaking
such disruption activities [44].
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There was some indication on the blackmarket that actors are aware blacklists are
not permanent. Those communicating this indicated it was important to them. They
wanted to make sure that if they were detected, they would still be able to fly with that
airline in the future. Therefore, airlines may want to consider a policy that travellers
repeatedly detected travelling, or attempting to travel, on fraudulently purchased tickets
be permanently blacklisted, regardless of whether the later ticket is purchased illegally
or not. While this may mean airlines are missing out on a small amount of future
revenue, it also increases the cost to potential complicit travellers.
It is apparent that employee misuse and corruption are elements enabling some
forms of travel fraud. The level of employee misuse was not known, and it is likely to
be under-detected. Furthermore, there is some opportunity for law enforcement cor-
ruption, which can be particularly hard to detect. This can included systematic corrup-
tion, such as providing tips about when not to travel, or can be opportunistic, such as
accepting a bribe. It has been argued that successfully addressing corruption requires a
systematic approach by governments [48]. Broad law enforcement anti-corruption
initiatives, that are aimed at the issue overall rather than on specific crime types,
include establishing an anti-corruption agency, providing adequate pay, staff rotation,
ensuring staff are not politically appointed, creating disincentives for corruption,
removing opportunity, increasing transparency and addressing cultural issues within
the organisation [48]. In relation to insiders, restricting the ability to issue tickets or
internal currencies, having systems in place to detect misuse, and the use of background
checks at the time of recruitment may also be beneficial.
One participant suggested a way to prevent people buying tickets fraudulently was
to reduce the demand for cheap tickets. Along this line of thinking, there is a need to
reduce global inequalities and the mistreatment of people, such as the labour and sexual
exploitation that is associated with human smuggling. Similarly, legitimate ways for
people to seek refuge, rather than travelling illegally to seek asylum, could reduce
demand. Of course, such approaches require political will, which seems to be in short
supply.
Interventions aimed at the marketplace
The marketplace for fraudulently obtained tickets includes the online blackmarket
where sellers advertise, as well as the fake travel agencies, and communities where
tickets are sold by word of mouth. One way to disrupt fake travel agencies is website
takedown. Websites can be taken down by requesting registrars suspend the domain
name, or hosting provider remove the offending site [49]. Ownership of website
takedown can be problematic when there is no specific brand involved. For example,
a website imitating a legitimate airline or travel agent may come to the attention of, and
by dealt with by, the brand owner. However, fake travel agencies that do not imitate any
one particular brand are perhaps less likely to be requested to be taken down, even
though they cause harm to the industry overall [50]. IATA and ARC accredit travel
agencies, and could potentially take a role in requesting websites be taken down that
have been linked to fraudulent tickets and are not accredited with them, or pay for
commercial takedown companies to do this for them. IATA and ARC may also be in a
position to provide advice to the travel industry about how to request websites that are
copying legitimate travel businesses to be taken down.
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It can be difficult for potential travellers to verify if an online travel agency is
legitimate or not. As stated, travel agencies are accredited through IATA and/or ARC.
However, knowing to check for accreditation, or being able to identify where accred-
itation is faked, is unlikely for the average consumer. Even fake travel agencies can
have websites that appear professional, and some participants noted the fake travel
agencies were purchasing Google AdWords in order to promote their websites.
Here, Google has some past experience in how to disrupt the trade in illicit goods.
Google bars unlicensed pharmacies from purchasing AdWords, by cross-referencing
against a list of law-abiding pharmacies. Google does this to comply with US legisla-
tion relating to the supply of prescription drugs. Therefore, the organisation has the
capability, but not necessarily the incentive, to ensure advertisements for travel services
come from organisations accredited with IATA and ARC. It is possible the collective
power of the travel industry will carry some clout with Google to implement such a
preventative measure. While Google’s intervention did not completely stop the illicit
trade in pharmaceuticals, their actions did mean operators had to find alternative ways
in which to drive traffic to their online stores [36].
Conclusion and discussion
Methods bywhich airline tickets are fraudulently obtained are usually compromised credit
card details and loyalty point accounts, gaining access to the global distribution systems by
compromising travel agencies, and to business accounts by compromising organisations.
Identity fraud may play a role, however this is more difficult to carry out successfully, and
involves a greater amount of effort than other methods. The fraudulent trade in travel gift
vouchers has also been identified as a means for obtaining illicit airline tickets.
While some fraudulently obtained tickets are detected and cancelled before they are
flown, it is apparent that many travellers using these tickets travel successfully. In some
cases, the booking is not detected in time, and sometimes it is not known to be
fraudulent until some time later, when a chargeback is received. Those obtaining tickets
use a variety of methods minimise the likelihood the booking will be detected before
the flight takes place.
Those travelling on fraudulently obtained tickets purchase them through online
blackmarkets, fake travel agencies, by word of mouth, or through genuine travel agencies
where an employee is passing through stolen credentials. In some cases, they have not
purchased the ticket directly themselves, but are provided the ticket by a mule handler,
smuggler or trafficker, or by co-offenders they are committing other crimes with.
When a traveller is detected travelling on fraudulently obtained tickets, they invari-
ably claim they are unaware of the ticket’s origin. They claim the ticket was obtained
through a family member of friend, or a travel agency that must have been dodgy.
While some of the claims of innocence are likely to be true, buyers on the blackmarkets
are being coached to make similar assertions, and there are suggestions they falsify
receipts and communications to back up their story. This causes problems for law
enforcement when it comes to taking legal action against travellers, and subsequently
there are few prosecutions.
Travel fraud has been linked to a number of other crime types. These include
smuggling contraband, including drugs, cash, and cigarettes and tobacco. In some
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cases the movement of people has been linked to human trafficking, including for
sexual exploitation, human smuggling, and illegal immigration. Property crimes in-
clude theft and robberies, including within airports, such as pickpocketing and
organised shoplifting. In addition to smuggling cash, people can be transported to a
country for the purpose of opening bank accounts, which are used for money launder-
ing. And finally, further credit card fraud can be enabled through travel fraud, such as
setting up skimmers and travelling to new destinations in order to use compromised
card data.
Travel fraud has changed over time. This change has been driven by new opportu-
nities, as well as displacement, as old methods have become more difficult to carry out
successfully. This explains why there are so many different methods for fraudulently
obtaining tickets. It is likely offenders will continue to innovate, taking advantage of
different ways the travel industry serves their legitimate customers, as well as new, and
existing, fraud methods that arise.
Airlines and the travel industry attempt to detect fraudulent bookings before travel
has taken place. One way of doing this is the use of fraud detection systems, which are
often paid-for services offered by the financial sector. There may be ways to improve
the scope for what is monitored for fraud detection, such as by expanding the
information sharing groups that have been set up. These groups have been built upon
established relationships, and the sharing of information is a sensitive issue, particularly
with competitors. However, to quote Aristotle, ‘the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts’. Organisations may see the benefits of quickly detecting travel fraud outweigh
the cost of letting competitors know details of when they have been defrauded.
Furthermore, the sharing of information between the travel and financial industries
can be improved. This includes banks providing timely confirmation if a card has been
compromised, and conversely, being informed if a fraudulent purchase has been
attempted, but voided before the transaction has been completed.
Some of the challenges for law enforcement relate to understanding the travel fraud
problem. The use of proforma interview schedules, to ask detailed and pertinent
questions and seek evidence, may be beneficial. Feeding the intelligence gained back
to an international system would also be advantageous, so it can be analysed strategi-
cally. Ultimately, focusing on those obtaining tickets, rather than travellers, may have
more impact. Some law enforcement are also providing central points of contact for
receiving reports of fraud from the travel industry.
Some of the issues when it comes to detecting and preventing travel fraud come
down to incentives for the various players. For example, participants perceived finan-
cial institutions as having no incentive to detect fraud, or to quickly confirm fraudulent
transactions, as the cost is borne by the merchant. Law enforcement may be reluctant to
pursue travel fraud cases due to their transnational nature, which makes it difficult to
obtain evidence and prolongs the investigation. Furthermore, disrupting the advertising
of fake travel agencies means the advertising platform is missing out on revenue, and
increasing their costs. These problems may be addressed by asking how organisations
might be rewarded for being more proactive, or conversely, what they might suffer as a
consequence of not taking action when it is in their power to do so.
Finally, as Nohl’s [28] work demonstrates, travel is booked using legacy systems.
Even old systems pose new threats, and travel fraud is likely to continue to evolve in
new ways. The challenge will be in identifying new methods and being able to respond
Hutchings A.
appropriately, and timely, fixing vulnerabilities in these systems as they arise, or
detecting them before they are exploited.
This research has attempted to overcome the significant difficulties associated with
this challenging area of research. However, a number of limitations in the research
design are identified. First, while participants were from the US, Asia, and Europe,
there may be regional differences in the characteristics of the frauds that have not been
identified. Second, this analysis only looks at the current state of play. It is likely that
travel fraud will change over time, with new opportunities and in response to crime
prevention and fraud detection methods. Furthermore, it is possible additional methods
to commit travel fraud are more successful, and have not been identified. And finally, as
this research is exploratory, it is not attempted to quantify the various aspects that have
been identified.
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